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SOCIAL SECURITY’S 70TH 
ANNIVERSARY: SURVIVING 20 YEARS
OF REFORM
l. randall wray
Social Security turned 70 on August 14,although no national celebration marked
the occasion.
1 Rather, our top policymakers in Washington continue to suggest
that the system is “unsustainable.”While our nation’s most successful social pro-
gram, and among its longest lived, has allowed generations of Americans to live
with dignity in retirement, many think it is time to retire Social Security itself.
They claim it is necessary to shift more responsibility to individuals and to scale
back the promises made to the coming waves of retiring baby boomers.
Even the nonpartisan Social Security Administration has been enlisted in the effort
to lower expectations, posting on its website the following caution to today’s 26-year-old: “Unless
changes are made, when you reach age 62 in 2041, benefits for all retirees could be cut by 26 per-
cent and could continue to be reduced every year thereafter.If you lived to be 100 years old in 2079
(which will be more common by then), your scheduled benefits could be reduced by 32 percent
from today’s scheduled levels.”Private accounts,lower benefits,and—perhaps—higher taxes are the
prescribed remedy for “unfunded”trillions of commitments we have made to tomorrow’s seniors.
Senior Scholar l. randall wray is a professor at the University of Missouri–Kansas City and director of research at the Center for Full
Employment and Price Stability.
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In this note,I provide a brief assessment of the curious transfor-
mation of America’s most popular and efficient safety net into a
program that is widely regarded as requiring thorough reform.
There is no question that Social Security has been under
attack by well-organized and well-funded opponents for the past
two decades. As my colleague Max Skidmore has documented,
the enemies of the program have been there from the beginning,
but they have had little success until recently (Skidmore 1999).
Originally, the program was criticized on the basis that it was
socialistic.However,the framers of the Social Security Act antici-
pated such claims and consequently formulated the program as 
if it were an insurance plan, with payroll taxes that could be
counted as “contributions” and “benefit payments” that bore
some relation to the contributions. Americans came to believe
that they earned benefits because they “paid into” the program.
And because the program was never means tested, it enjoyed
wide support. Hence, rather than socialistic welfare, the program
has been viewed as little different from a pension plan.For several
decades, this misconception effectively quashed criticism, so the
program was expanded, rather than cut (Wray 2001).
However, beginning in the 1980s, the critics seized on an
apparent weakness. Slower economic growth after 1970, lower
birth rates,longer life spans,and especially the coming retirement
of a wave of baby boomers all supposedly threatened the long-
run financial viability of Social Security. The enemies of the
program formulated a two-pronged attack. First, they began a
campaign to convince younger people that because of shaky
finances they would never collect benefits equal to what they paid
into the program (Skidmore 1999). This became an increasingly
easy sell for younger, high-income workers because the redis-
tributive aspects of the program provide fairly low “money’s
worth” returns for the “pension” provided by Social Security.
(Note that the debate mostly ignored all the “nonpension”aspects
of the program,such as disability and survivors’benefits,which
make it a good deal for just about all Americans.) Second, the
Greenspan Commission was formed in 1983 to resolve the long-
run financial problems with “reforms”that included large payroll
tax increases and a gradual rise of the normal age of retirement
(Papadimitriou and Wray 1999a). These changes reinforced the
claim that Social Security was a bad deal for younger workers,
who were already seeing take-home pay fall during a period in
which labor was under attack by the Reagan administration.
After the Greenspan Commission had “solved”the financial
problems, the Social Security Administration adopted increas-
ingly pessimistic assumptions for its long-run forecasts—as
documented by Skidmore (2001) and by actuary David Langer
(2000).Not surprisingly,a “looming financial crisis”reappeared,
and hysteria about reforming Social Security was revived. Taxes
would have to be raised, benefits would have to be cut, and,
more importantly, the return on Trust Fund assets would have
to be increased. As the stock market performed well through-
out most of the 1980s and then picked up the pace in the 1990s,
the enemies saw a chance to privatize the program while play-
ing the role of savior. At the same time, the “friends” of Social
Security,mostly Democrats and Big Labor,also saw a chance to
exploit popular fears. They would play along with the enemies,
pretending there really was a financial problem, so that they
could save Social Security and thereby win votes. Polls consis-
tently show that voters trust Democrats more on Social Security;
hence,given a choice between Republican schemes to “save”the
program through privatization or Democratic plans to “save”it
by placing the Trust Funds off limits, the voters would choose
the Democrats.
I have been writing about Social Security since the late 1980s,
and in 1990, I published a critique of Can America Afford to
Grow Old?,a book by Henry Aaron,Michael Bosworth,and Gary
Burtless that argued that the only way to take care of baby
boomers would be to immediately increase national saving
(Wray 1990, 1990–91; Aaron et al. 1989; Aaron 1990–91). This
could be done,according to the authors,by running budget sur-
pluses,adding to national savings,and increasing the size of the
Trust Fund. Hence, this book could be seen as a road map for
the evolving Democratic party position during the Clinton years.
However,I argued at the time that a larger Trust Fund could not
in any way provide for future retirees, nor would it add to
national savings.Rather,the Trust Fund represents a leakage that
lowers aggregate demand; all else being equal, this lowers eco-
nomic growth and thus makes it more difficult to take care of
future retirees.Aaron wrote a response to my piece, arguing that
he had thought that such “vulgar Keynesianism”was “blessedly
extinct” (Aaron 1990–91). According to Aaron, running budget
surpluses to add to the Trust Fund would indeed increase saving
and lower interest rates, thus stimulating investment and eco-
nomic growth, making it easier to take care of retirees.
As we now know, the Clinton budget did turn sharply
toward surplus,and those surpluses were projected at the time to
continue for at least a generation.A number of economists advo-
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plan by Aaron,et al.,President Clinton proposed to take a portion
of each year’s surplus and add it to the Trust Fund (Wray 1999a,
1999b). Essentially, this would allow double counting of the sur-
plus run by Social Security, since most of the budget surpluses
accrued during the Clinton years were due to payroll taxes that far
exceeded program benefits. During the 2000 presidential race,
Al Gore used Social Security “lockboxes”as a primary campaign
issue, confusing an internal bookkeeping operation (as Social
Security’s assets in the Trust Fund equal the Treasury’s liabilities
to Social Security, this is a case of the government owing itself)
with availability of “finance” for the government as a whole. A
wide variety of economists (including Aaron) embarrassed them-
selves by claiming that this was “good economics,”going so far as
to sign a petition in support of the plan (Wray 1999b).
I was told by economic advisors to top Democrats and big
unions that they realized lockboxes were nonsense but believed
it was politically pragmatic to endorse irregular accounting as
a means to “save” the program. I responded that there was no
need to run budget surpluses in order to credit Social Security’s
Trust Fund; the government can immediately credit the Trust
Fund with trillions of dollars of assets, offset by the Treasury’s
commitment to make timely benefit payments when and as
necessary (Wray 1999b).Most importantly,I worried about the
long-term damage that would be done to the program by cre-
ating a false crisis and then resolving it with a preposterous
gimmick. Of course, the Democrats’strategy did backfire: Gore
lost the election,the Clinton budget surpluses brought down the
economy and morphed into huge deficits “as far as the eye can
see,” and President Bush took on Social Security “reform” as a
major goal of his administration. Ironically, the Republicans
now quote President Clinton whenever Democrats try to deny
that the program faces a crisis, leaving Dems in the untenable
position of either admitting they were lying in the 1990s or that
they are lying now (Wray 2005).
During the Clinton years I wrote a series of pieces critical
of alternative plans to “save”Social Security,including those pro-
posed by Democrats as well as those advanced by Republicans
(Wray 1999a, 1999b; Papadimitriou and Wray 1999a, 1999b).
After reading one of these critiques (Papadimitriou and Wray
1999b), Charles P. Blahous, policy director for Senator Judd
Gregg (R-NH), engaged me in a series of e-mail exchanges. He
accepted my critiques of the Clinton plan, but was bothered 
by my critique of the Gregg-Breaux proposal (which, briefly,
included partial privatization, a government-subsidized sav-
ings plan, and a combination of benefit cuts and tax hikes;
Blahous had apparently played some role in formulating the
plan, and many of its features were included in later reform
proposals).He also insisted that there really was a Social Security
crisis and that the only feasible solution would be to privatize.
He raised a number of issues that appeared at the time to be
rather bizarre: that the crisis would begin as soon as tax rev-
enue fell below benefit payments (that is, long before the
Armageddon date cited by many economists as the year in
which the Trust Fund is expected to be depleted); that faster
economic growth would make the problem worse; that under
current law, benefits would have to be cut by more than a
quarter as soon as the Trust Fund was depleted; and that Social
Security was a terrible deal for blacks and for women. More
interestingly, when President Bush appointed his Reform
Commission to study the problem, none other than Blahous
was picked as executive director.
2 Blahous’s hand could be seen
all over the various reports issued by the Commission, with
many of the same arguments that he had made previously in
e-mails to me. The Commission claimed that Social Security
was “broken”and required a “complete overhaul”;it bemoaned
the bad deal cut for women and minorities; it engaged in a
sleight of hand by comparing its “reforms”against “current law
benefits” that were actually a quarter below those promised in
the current benefit formula (none of the proposed reforms
came close to providing the legislated benefits); it claimed that
the present value of Social Security’s shortfall was $3.2 trillion;
and it proposed partial privatization and benefit cuts as the
solution (Wray 2001).
3What appeared then to be bizarre claims
are now commonplace.
However,terrorism and security issues forced Social Security
to the back burner during the first Bush term.After reelection,
Bush felt he had a mandate to return to privatization of Social
Security. At first, supporters of privatization claimed that it
would resolve the “financial crisis”; eventually, the President
admitted that the private accounts would worsen the program’s
finances (Wray 2005).Finally,he returned to the Commission’s
suggestion to drop wage indexing of future benefits (at least
for all but the lowest-income workers) and hinted that he would
consider elimination of the cap on wages subject to taxation
(Wray 2005). If successful, these changes would substantially
erode the support of middle- and upper-income earners, who
would face huge cuts to benefits and higher taxes. Partial pri-
vatization would almost certainly lead to lower retirement4 Policy Note, 2005 / 6
payments for many lower-income workers (with management
fees eating up the returns on their small accounts). Further, as
many middle- and upper-income workers would opt for the pri-
vatization alternative, the amount of benefits received directly
from Social Security by them would fall toward insignificance
(Krugman 2005). Over the long haul, the nonprivatized por-
tion of Social Security would be converted to a “welfare” pro-
gram, important only to low-income people. This could be the
last straw for what has long been America’s most successful and
popular government program.
The truth is that Social Security does not,and indeed cannot,
face any financial crisis. It is a federal government program
and as such cannot become insolvent. Social Security benefits
are paid in the same way that the federal government makes
expenditures for all of its other programs:by cutting a Treasury
check or, increasingly, by directly crediting a bank account.
Social Security is an unusual program only in that we pretend
the payroll taxes “pay for”benefits;in reality,trying to maintain
a balance between these flows is purely a politically inspired
accounting procedure.Any federal government spending must
be accounted for, but it cannot be financially constrained by
specific or even general tax revenues. Further, the Trust Fund
does not and cannot provide finance for Social Security. So
long as the full faith and credit of the U.S. government stands
behind the promised benefits,they can and will be paid,whether
the Trust Fund has a positive or negative balance.Many propo-
nents of the current system who understand this economic real-
ity still want to accumulate a Trust Fund on the argument that
it provides political protection.Perhaps the Trust Fund provided
cover at one time, but it no longer serves even that purpose. It
is precisely because there is a Trust Fund that the privatizers are
making headway: if there were no Trust Fund, there would be
nothing to privatize. Indeed, some of the privatizers see the
trillion and a half dollars in the Trust Fund as a potential boost
to flagging equity markets. Further, the eventual “exhaustion”
of the Trust Fund plays a critical role in all of the schemes to
increase returns on assets through privatization. Hence, the
irregular accounting only hinders development of a clear under-
standing of the issues involved.
Social Security provides a substantial measure of security
for aged persons, survivors, and disabled persons—and their
dependents. It has never missed a payment, nor will it ever do
so, as long as the full faith and credit of the U.S. government
lies behind the program. Reform might be desired, and might
even be necessary, but not because of any mythical looming
financial crisis. Our nation is undergoing slow but important
demographic changes that probably warrant informed discus-
sion of the future shape of Social Security. While the baby
boomers receive all the attention, other demographic and eco-
nomic changes may be more important, including a greater
proportion of female-headed households, higher immigration
and the rising proportion of “minority”populations (already a
majority in several states), and increasing economic inequality.
Combined with the disappearance of employer-provided defined
benefit pension plans and reduced employment security, these
trends actually might strengthen the arguments for more gen-
erous and secure publicly provided safety nets—not for benefit
cuts and privatization. However, none of these challenges rises
to the level of a programmatic crisis; we will have years and
even decades to make adjustments to Social Security should
we decide they are necessary.In the meantime,happy 70th birth-
day, Social Security, with many happy returns.
Notes
1. Interestingly,the only reference to the anniversary available
on the Social Security Administration’s website is an Orlando
Sentinel editorial by Jo Anne B.Barnhart,commissioner of
Social Security,who notes that while the program has paid
“approximately $8.4 trillion in benefits to nearly 200 mil-
lion people,”and while the benefits for “our parents,grand-
parents, and great-grandparents ...a r e  s e c u r e  and will be
paid . . . the same cannot be said for my teenage son and
his friends”(Barnhart 2005).
2. Before that appointment, Blahous served as executive
director of the business-sponsored Alliance for Worker
Retirement Security from June 2000 through February
2001. He joined the National Economic Council on
February 26, 2001, and now serves as special assistant to
the president for economic policy.
3. See Diamond and Orszag (2002a) for a careful analysis 
of the Commission’s reports. Blahous tried to defend the
claims made for the various “reforms”in a memo character-
ized by New York Times columnist Paul Krugman as “hys-
terical.The number of non sequiturs and misrepresentations
Mr. Blahous manages to squeeze into just a few pages may
set a record”(Krugman 2002).See Blahous’s response (2002)
and Diamond and Orszag’s rejoinder (2002b).The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 5
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